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Abstract
This paper provides the first unified explanation of behavior in coordinated
attack games under both public and private information. It demonstrates that
the main experimental results, such as threshold strategies, comparative stat-
ics, and the differences in behavior under public and private information, are
robust predictions of limited depth of reasoning models. This is in contrast
to equilibrium, which mispredicts the coordinating roles of public and private
information. The analysis has implications for understanding macroeconomic
phenomena, like currency attacks and debt crises, which are commonly modeled
using incomplete information coordinated attack games.
Keywords: coordination games, level-k models, cognitive hierarchy models, global
games
1 Introduction
Consider a simple coordination game used to model a speculative attack. Players
have the option to attack a currency peg. If enough players attack, the attack is
successful, and the peg collapses. If not enough players attack, the attack fails, and
the peg holds. The threshold for a successful attack depends on the fundamentals of
∗Department of Economics, University College London, Gower Street, London, UK WC1E 6BT
(e-mail: t.kneeland@ucl.ac.uk). I would like to thank my advisor, Yoram Halevy, for substantial
guidance and feedback. I am grateful to Colin Camerer, Vince Crawford, David Freeman, Li Hao,
Frank Hienemann, Wei Li, Mike Peters, Luba Petersen, and Matthew Rabin for helpful comments
and discussions. And, I am grateful to Frank Heinemann, Rosemarie Nagel and Peter Ockenfels
for allowing me access to their experimental data. Comments by anonymous referees were greatly
appreciated.
1
the economy. If fundamentals are strong, a large proportion of players must attack
in order for the attack to be successful. If fundamentals are weak, only a small
proportion of players are needed for a successful attack.
Heinemann et al. (2004), Duffy and Ochs (2012), Heinemann et al. (2009), and
Cornand (2006) test coordinated attack games in the laboratory. There are two
main aggregate findings. (1) Players use threshold strategies. They attack when
fundamentals are weak and restrain from attacking when fundamentals are strong.
This holds regardless of whether players receive public or private information about
fundamentals. And, (2) the degree of coordination depends upon the information
structure.1 Public information increases coordination relative to private information.
These results provide a challenge for equilibrium theory. Private information
generates disperse higher-order beliefs which weaken complementarities in actions
generating a unique threshold equilibrium. In contrast, public information strength-
ens complementarities between actions generating multiple equilibria driven by self-
fulfilling beliefs. Equilibrium predicts the use of threshold strategies under private
information but does not explain why behavior is tied to fundamentals under public
information. Further, equilibrium mispredicts the coordinating roles of different types
of information, predicting weakly better coordination under private information than
under public information.2
This paper shows that an alternative solution concept, based on limited depth of
reasoning, provides a unified explanation of the pattern of behavior under both public
and private information. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to provide
a consistent explanation of the existing experimental literature on coordinated attack
games.
Limited depth of reasoning, like level-k thinking and cognitive hierarchy, is a
behaviorally-motivated approach to reasoning in games.3 Each player has a bounded
1We use the term coordination here to mean that players use the same strategies. In a complete
information game, if players use the same pure strategy they would perfectly coordinate on either
attacking or not attacking. But under incomplete information, even if players use the same strategy,
there could be ex post coordination failure where some players attack and others do not attack
because they have different private information. However, if players are not using the same threshold
strategy this will only increase the degree of ex post coordination failure.
2Even though equilibrium allows multiple equilibria under public information, it is possible for
players to coordinate on the same equilibrium, thus generating perfect coordination. The inconsis-
tency of equilibrium with experimental data lies in the private information predictions. Equilibrium
fails to explain the observed coordination failure under private information.
3For, pioneering works in the literature see Stahl and Wilson (1994; 1995), Nagel (1995), Costa-
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depth of reasoning determined by her cognitive type. L0 types have zero depths of
reasoning - their behavior is specified outside of the model. L1 types have one depth
of reasoning. They best respond to L0 types. L2 types have two depths of reasoning.
They best respond to some belief over L0 and L1 types. And, so on, with Lk types
best responding to some belief over lower types {L0,L1,. . .,Lk-1}. All higher types
anchor their beliefs in the nonstrategic L0 type and calculate their optimal actions
using a finite number of iterated best responses.
Limited depth of reasoning is consistent with the existing experimental results.
Behavior is tied to fundamentals under any information structure with players attack-
ing only when fundamentals are weak. Moreover, limited depth of reasoning predicts
that coordination is greater under public information than private information. Play-
ers with different depths of reasoning treat public information similarly but private
information differently. Public information coordinates higher- and lower-order beliefs
about fundamentals. This coordinates the behavior of players with different depths
of reasoning. In contrast, private information decreases coordination by creating dif-
ferences between higher- and lower-order beliefs and hence differences in the behavior
of players with different depths of reasoning.
This paper goes on to show that the aggregate experimental results are robust
predictions of limited depth of reasoning models. The results hold under weak as-
sumptions on the non-strategic L0 type. And, they hold under any limited depth of
reasoning model. That is, they hold for any specification of beliefs that an Lk type
might hold over lower types and for any distribution of types in the model. The re-
sults even hold if there is some proportion of sophisticated types in the model (types
that have correct beliefs about the types of others, infinite depths of reasoning, and
realize that others may also have infinite depths of reasoning).
Part of the difficulty with models like level-k thinking and cognitive hierarchy is
that L0 behavior and the type distribution must be specified outside of the model.
This is problematic because both L0 behavior and the type distribution do not appear
to be stable across games. However, the theoretical predictions of this paper are
largely independent of these specifications. Even without knowing L0 behavior or the
type distribution, limited depth of reasoning models make robust, testable predictions.
In addition, this paper analyzes the experimental data from Heinemann et al.
Gomes et al. (2001), and Camerer et al. (2004). For a recent survey of this literature, see Costa-
Gomes et al. (2013).
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(2004) and classifies subjects as either level-k or equilibrium types using maximum
likelihood to fit a finite mixture model to the data. Allowing for level-k types signifi-
cantly improves the model’s ability to explain the experimental data. Approximately,
83 percent of subjects can be classified as level-k types and 17 percent of subjects as
equilibrium types. Further, the level-k model explains the data just as well as a model
with level-k and equilibrium types. Limited depth of reasoning provides a consistent
explanation for experimental behavior at both the individual and aggregate level.
Three papers study a related class of incomplete information games under limited
depth of reasoning. Shapiro et al. (2014) and Cornand and Heinemann (2014) test
these games in the laboratory and find, respectively, that the level-k and cognitive
hierarchy models are consistent with behavior.4 The analysis is similar to the maxi-
mum likelihood analysis done in this paper, showing that there exists a limited depth
of reasoning model that fits the experimental behavior better than equilibrium. We
reinforce these results by demonstrating that the same holds true for the coordinated
attack game. But, the insights from these papers can not be extended to the coor-
dinated attack game. Neither of the two papers investigates the coordinating roles
of different types of information or considers the robust predictions of limited depth
of reasoning models. Cornand and Heinemann (2015) uses the estimated type distri-
bution from Cornand and Heinemann (2014) to analyze the welfare effects of public
information under the cognitive hierarchy model.
The motivation in this paper is similar to Strzalecki (2014) who uses limited depth
of reasoning models to explain observed behavior in Rubinstein’s (1989) email game,
which is a 2-player coordinated attack game with private information. Strzalecki in-
vestigates whether the limited depth of reasoning model is consistent with observed
behavior under a particular information structure. This paper is focused on under-
standing behavior across different information structures. In addition, the limited
depth of reasoning solution concept is applied differently in the two papers. The
analysis of Strzalecki would be equivalent to fixing the solution concept as the set
mth-order rationalizable actions (for some fixed and small m). However, the analysis
in the current paper closely follows the approach of the existing level-k and cognitive
hierarchy literature and focuses on the outcomes that result from a fixed L0.
4Players have both an information motive (incentive to match fundamentals) and a coordination
motive (incentive to match behavior of others) in these games. Shapiro et al. find that the level-k
model does particularly well in games where the coordination motive dominates the information
motive, and less well when the information motive dominates.
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This paper is closely related to the global games literature. The coordinated
attack game analyzed here is one of the workhorse models of global games. Global
games, initiated by Carlsson and van Damme (1993b,a) and furthered by Morris and
Shin (1998, 2003), has shown that multiplicity in coordination games stems from
common knowledge of payoffs. The concern is that increased precision of public
information may be destabilizing; it could lead to multiplicity driven by self-fulfilling
beliefs. However, both the existing experimental literature and the boundedly rational
approach to strategic reasoning studied here suggests that public information does
not have destabilizing effects.5
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the coordinated attack
game and the equilibrium results. Section 3 establishes the limited depth of reasoning
results. Section 4 analyzes the experimental data and discusses the consistency of
level-k with the experimental literature. And, Section 5 concludes. Omitted proofs
can be found in Appendix A.
2 Coordinated Attack Game
A simple model of a coordinated attack is presented. The model follows Morris and
Shin (2004) and Bannier (2002). The coordinated attack game is interpreted as a
speculative attack throughout the rest of this paper. This model can be applied to
describe other phenomena such as bank runs, debt crises, coordinated investment,
and political change.
There is a continuum of players indexed by i and uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
Players may attack the exchange rate peg or do nothing. There is a cost t of attacking.
If a player attacks and the peg is abandoned, the player receives a positive payoff D,
for a net payoff of D − t. It is assumed D > t. The payoff from not attacking is
zero. The exchange rate peg is abandoned if and only if the proportion of players
attacking, denoted by l, is no less than a critical value θ ∈ R.
The critical value θ parametrizes the strength of the status quo. It is often referred
5A second application of global games is as an equilibrium selection mechanism. In this appli-
cation, all commonly known information is treated as private information (with vanishing noise).
This selects a unique threshold equilibrium - providing an explanation for the observed behavior.
However, this interpretation necessarily limits the study of behavior under different types of infor-
mation because public information is equated with private information. Allowing for the existence
of boundedly rational types allows us to talk meaningfully about behavior under different types of
information.
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to as the fundamentals of the economy. Under the speculative attack interpretation,
θ can be interpreted as foreign exchange reserves held by the Central Bank. A higher
θ represents better fundamentals and raises the threshold for a successful attack. The
payoffs for each player can be summarized by the function pi : [0, 1]xR→ R, the payoff
gain from attacking. It is defined as
pi(l, θ) =
{
D − t if l ≥ θ
−t otherwise
2.1 Common Knowledge of Payoffs
There are three different cases to consider when payoffs are common knowledge:
θ > 1 Even if all players attack, the fundamentals are sufficiently strong to main-
tain the exchange rate peg. There is a unique equilibrium in which none
of the players attack.
θ ≤ 0 The fundamentals are too weak for the peg to be maintained. The unique
equilibrium is one in which all players attack.
0 < θ ≤ 1 The currency regime is ripe for attack. There exist two equilibria - one
in which all players attack and the exchange rate peg is abandoned and
another in which no player attacks and the peg is upheld.
This game has multiple equilibria whenever 0 < θ ≤ 1. Attacking is only worthwhile
if a player expects others to attack. As beliefs are self-fulfilling, they are not tied to
fundamentals and there is no way to predict an attack.
2.2 Incomplete Information of Payoffs
The above game can be converted into an incomplete information game by letting θ
be unknown and having each player receive signals about θ. The distribution of θ
and the signal processes are assumed to be common knowledge. Each player receives
a private signal xi and a public signal y about θ, where xi = θ+ i with i ∼ N(0, 1β )
and y = θ + η with η ∼ N(0, 1
α
). The fundamental θ is distributed uniformly on the
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real line.6,7
Conditional on the information received, θ is normally distributed with a mean
formed by a weighted average of the public and private signals. Given signals x and
y, θ is conditionally distributed according to
θ|x, y ∼ N
(
(1− µ)y + µx, 1
α + β
)
(1)
where µ = β
α+β
. A player’s strategy in the incomplete information game is a function
s : R → {attack, not attack}, which lists an action for any private signal she might
receive.
There is a unique equilibrium in the incomplete information game provided private
information is sufficiently precise relative to public information (i.e. α√
β
≤ √2pi). In
this case, there will be a unique threshold equilibrium where players attack if and
only if x ≤ x¯E, for some unique x¯E.8 However, if public information is relatively
precise there exists multiple equilibria driven by self-fulfilling beliefs. These results
are established in Morris and Shin (2004).
If there is only private information (public information is imprecise, α→ 0), then
the condition, α√
β
≤ √2pi, holds automatically and there is a unique threshold equi-
librium. If there is only public information (private information is imprecise, β → 0),
the condition does not hold and there are multiple equilibria. Thus, equilibrium the-
ory makes a sharp prediction for the case of private information but is uninformative
about behavior under public information. Further, equilibrium mispredicts the coor-
dinating roles of different types of information, predicting perfect coordination under
private information.9
6The assumption that θ is uniformly distributed on the real line is typical of the global games
literature. The assumption presents no technical difficulties as long as we restrict attention to
conditional beliefs. See Hartigan (1983) for further discussion of this issue.
7The assumptions of normality and the uniform prior are not essential. The results go through
with a generalized prior and signal structure. This is shown in a previous version of this paper,
Kneeland (2012).
8Notice that the threshold cutoff x¯E(y) will depend on the public signal y. We suppress that
dependence and just write x¯E , taking the public signal y as fixed.
9The global games literature establishes that a unique equilibrium in these types of coordinated
attack games depends on the degree of payoff uncertainty in the model (e.g. Morris and Shin, 2003).
Typically, this is modeled by introducing asymmetric information over fundamentals. However, we
can think about introducing payoff uncertainty in other ways, such as uncertainty about the risk
preferences of other players. (Hellwig, 2002) shows that allowing for asymmetric information about
the degree of risk aversion will induce a unique threshold equilibrium even when information about
fundamentals is public information. Thus, this type of payoff uncertainty could explain why subjects
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In the next section, we analyze the coordinated attack game under limited depth
of reasoning and show that it’s consistent with the existing experimental results.
3 Level-k Thinking
In a limited depth of reasoning model each player’s behavior is determined by her
cognitive type, which is drawn from a discrete distribution over a particular hierarchy
of types {L0,L1, . . . ,Lk, . . .}. L0 types are non-strategic, their behavior is specified
outside the model. L0 types act as the starting point for players’ strategic thinking:
L1 best responds to L0, L2 to a distribution over L0 and L1, and so on. The behavior
of all types can be calculated recursively, in a finite number of steps.
In a general limited depth of reasoning model, Lk types best respond to some
distribution over lower types, where each type’s beliefs about others are defined ac-
cording to some prespecified rule. Under cognitive hierarchy, Lk types best respond
to a mixture of L0,L1, . . . ,Lk− 1 types with weights determined by the conditional
Poisson distribution (e.g. Camerer et al. 2004). Under level-k thinking, Lk types best
respond to Lk-1 types (e.g. Costa-Gomes and Crawford 2006). The main portion of
this paper works within a level-k thinking model. This is for simplicity only. The
results hold for any limited depth of reasoning model with Lk types best responding
to some distribution over lower types (see Appendix B).
Both limited depth of reasoning and equilibrium require that players play a best
response given their beliefs about others. This requirement alone is not enough to
generate precise predictions. Equilibrium adds the additional assumption that play-
ers’ actions and beliefs must be mutually consistent. Limited depth of reasoning
models do not impose mutual consistency. Instead, they impose the assumption that
players follow decision rules based on an iterated process of strategic thinking; players
recursively calculate optimal behavior based on the anchoring L0 type. This defines
a procedural model of player’s decisions that avoids the circular logic of equilibrium
imposed by the assumption of mutual consistency.
The estimated distribution of cognitive types tends to put most of the weight
on L1 and L2 types and negligible weight on L0 types (Costa-Gomes and Crawford
coordinate successfully under public information. However, this type of explanation does not explain
the failure to coordinate when information is private. Introducing other forms of payoff uncertainty
will not increase coordination under public information while decreasing coordination under private
information.
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2006; Costa-Gomes et al. 2001). The anchoring L0 type exists mainly in the minds
of others. This paper takes this position and assumes there is no support on L0 in
the type distribution. In most applications, the specification of L0 is the key to the
model’s explanatory power. However, the predictive power in this paper comes from
the recursive nature of the level-k model. The main results hold under only weak
restrictions on L0 behavior.
Let the behavior of L0 types be described by the cumulative distribution func-
tion Q(l|x, y) on [0, 1] and its associated density function q(l|x, y). The distribution
Q represents beliefs about the proportion of L0 types attacking. An L1 type who
receives private information x and public information y believes that others are be-
having according to Q(l|x, y). The perceived behavior of L0 may be influenced by
information.10 This is reasonable, as L0 types exist mainly in the minds of others.
Two restrictions are placed on the behavior of L0.
A1 Q(l|x, y) is weakly increasing in x and y for a given l.
A2 q(l|x, y) is continuous in x and y for a given l.
Assumption A1 assumes that the perceived behavior of L0 types varies monotonically
as information varies. This captures the likelihood that an L1 type with a low signal
believes that others are more likely to attack than an L1 type with a higher signal.
This is the natural specification for L0 as L0 is meant to capture players’ intuitive
responses to the game. Assumption A2 requires q(l|x, y) to be continuous with respect
to x and y. This restriction is included for convenience to ensure continuity in the
payoff functions. In previous level-k applications with incomplete information, L0
behavior was specified to be independent of information (e.g. Brocas et al. 2014 and
Crawford and Iriberri 2007). Assumptions A1 and A2 are satisfied automatically in
this case.
An L1 type who observes signals x and y believes that the behavior of others can
be described by the density function q(l|x, y). Given this, an L1 type knows that if
she attacks, she will receive positive payoff D whenever θ ≤ l and pay a fixed cost
t with certainty. For a given l, the expected gain from attacking can be written as
D ·Pr(θ ≤ l|x, y)−t. Given the conditional distribution of θ from (1), the probability
of a successful attack is
10L0’s behavior may also depend upon other variables like D or t. The results presented below
are robust to their inclusion.
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Pr(θ ≤ l|x, y) = Φ
(√
α + β (l − (µx+ (1− µ)y))
)
.
Averaging over l according to density q gives the expected payoff gain for an L1 type
who receives signals x and y. This can be written as
piL1(x) = D
ˆ 1
0
Φ
(√
α + β (l − (µx+ (1− µ)y))
)
q(l|x, y)dl − t.
Note that piL1 is continuous and strictly decreasing in x by A1 and A2. There is a
unique point κ1 such that pi
L1(κ1) = 0. The cutoff κ1 is determined implicitly by
ˆ 1
0
Φ
(√
α + β (l − (µx+ (1− µ)y))
)
q(l|x, y)dl = t
D
. (2)
L1 types play according to a threshold strategy with cutoff κ1. They attack if and
only if their private signal x is below the threshold cutoff κ1.
11,12
L2 types best respond to the belief that all others are playing a threshold strategy
with cutoff κ1. L2 types believe that players attack only if their private signal is
below the threshold cutoff κ1. From the perspective of L2 types, there is a successful
attack if and only if
Φ
(√
β(κ1 − θ)
)
≥ θ.
Let θ¯2 be determined uniquely by the solution to Φ(
√
β(κ1 − θ¯2)) = θ¯2. As a result,
an L2 type expects an attack to be successful whenever θ ≤ θ¯2.
The expected payoff gain for an L2 type who observes signals x and y is given by
D ·Pr(θ ≤ θ¯2|x, y)− t. Using the conditional distribution of θ from (1), the expected
payoff gain for an L2 type is given by
piL2(x, θ¯2) = D · Φ
(√
α + β
(
θ¯2 − (µx+ (1− µ)y)))− t.
Since piL2 is continuous and strictly decreasing in x, there is a unique point κ2 such
that piL2(κ2, θ¯
2) = 0. Therefore, L2 types play according to a threshold strategy with
11Assumption A2 guarantees continuity in expected payoffs. However, without this assumption
there still exists a unique point κ such that piL1 > 0 if x < κ and piL1 < 0 if x > κ. As a result, L1
types still play threshold strategies, although they may no longer be indifferent between attacking
and not attacking at the threshold signal.
12Also, note that this is for a given public signal y, thus κ1(y), but we suppress the notation
throughout the paper.
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cutoff κ2. They attack if and only if x ≤ κ2.
The behavior of higher types is similar to that of L2 types since they also believe
that others are playing threshold strategies. Lk types will play a threshold strategy
with cutoff κk, where κk is determined implicitly by
Φ
(√
α + β
(
θ¯k − (µκk + (1− µ)y)
))
=
t
D
(3)
with θ¯Lk determined by the solution to
Φ
(√
β(κk−1 − θ¯k)
)
= θ¯k. (4)
Proposition 1 summarizes these results.
Proposition 1. Let A1 and A2 hold. In the speculative attack game, an Lk type
attacks if and only if x ≤ κk for all k ≥ 1, where κ1 is determined by equation (2)
and κk (k > 1) is determined by equations (3) and (4).
3.1 Properties of the Level-k Solution
This section establishes some of the properties of the level-k solution. Proposition
2 establishes a set of comparative static results for the level-k model. Proposition
3 establishes the relationship between equilibrium and level-k behavior: if there is
a unique equilibrium, then the level-k cutoffs converge monotonically towards the
equilibrium cutoff as k converges to infinity. And, Corollary 1 establishes the level-k
results for two special information treatments: when there is only private information
and when there is only public information.
Define the likelihood of a successful attack to be proportional to the size of the
interval [−∞, θ¯], where θ¯ is the aggregate threshold for a successful attack under
level-k thinking (i.e. there will be a currency crisis if θ ≤ θ¯ and no crisis otherwise).13
The intuitive comparative static results hold under level-k thinking. If the payoff to
attacking (D) decreases, the likelihood of a successful attack decreases. If the cost
of attacking (t) increases, the likelihood of a successful attack decreases. If public
information (y) increases, then the likelihood of a successful attack crisis decreases.
Proposition 2 formalizes the comparative static results.
13The proof of Proposition 2 establishes that there exists a unique θ¯ such that given the distribution
of cognitive types there is a currency crisis if and only if θ ≤ θ¯.
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Proposition 2. Let A1 and A2 hold. The likelihood of a successful attack falls
whenever D decreases, t increases or y increases.
The comparative static predictions of the level-k model are consistent with the
existing experimental results in coordinated attack games. Heinemann et al. (2004),
Duffy and Ochs (2012), and Cornand (2006) all test how thresholds respond to changes
in the safe payoff t. They find that the likelihood of a successful attack falls whenever
t increases.
Proposition 3 establishes that the threshold cutoffs for each level-k type converge
monotonically to the equilibrium threshold as k tends to infinity. Given the spec-
ification for L0, the cutoffs either monotonically increase or decrease towards x¯E
depending on whether κ1 < x¯
E or κ1 > x¯
E, respectively.
Proposition 3. Let A1 and A2 hold and α√
β
≤ √2pi. Let x¯E be the equilibrium
cutoff and {κk} be the set of level-k cutoffs. Then the threshold cutoffs {κk} converge
monotonically towards the equilibrium cutoff x¯E as k→∞. In addition,
(i) if κ1 < x¯
E, then {κk} is a strictly increasing sequence
(ii) if κ1 > x¯
E, then {κk} is a strictly decreasing sequence
If the L1 cutoff is above the equilibrium cutoff under private information, then the
L1 cutoff will be higher than the cutoffs of all other Lk types (i.e. κ1 > κ2 > κ3 > · · · ).
For this to hold we require the behavior of L0 types to be biased towards the payoff
dominant equilibrium. This is a natural specification for L0. Many experiments find
that players tend to play payoff-dominant actions in coordination games, at least in
initial periods (e.g. Costa-Gomes et al., 2009).
For example, let P = {1
2
, 1; 1
2
, 0} be the distribution where half of the players at-
tack with probability one. P represents the beliefs of the equilibrium threshold player
when there is only private information. Because information is symmetric, each player
believes that half the players should receive a signal above her own. Therefore, the
threshold player believes that half the players will attack. If Q first-order stochasti-
cally dominates P , L0 behavior is biased towards the payoff-dominant equilibrium and
we are guaranteed that all level-k thresholds will be above the equilibrium threshold.
The next corollary formalizes the results when there is only public or only private
information.
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Corollary 1. Let A1 and A2 hold. Suppose players receive a private signal xi or a
public signal y with xi, y ∼ N(θ, 1β ). Let θ be distributed uniformly on the real line.
There exists a unique cutoff, κY , and unique cutoffs, κXk , for each k ≥ 1, such that
(i) Lk types attack if and only if xi ≤ κXk , for k ≥ 1 when information is private
(ii) Lk types attack if and only if y ≤ κY , for k ≥ 1 when information is public
When there is only public information, all types coordinate on the same threshold
cutoff. However, when information is private, different types use different thresholds.
This results from the interaction of bounded depths of reasoning with differences in
the nature of public and private information. Public information coordinates higher-
and lower-order beliefs about fundamentals. All types share the same beliefs about
fundamentals, regardless of their depth of reasoning. This coordinates the behavior
of players with different depths of reasoning. When information is private, higher-
order beliefs are more disperse than lower-order beliefs. This decreases coordination
by causing differences in behavior for players with different depths of reasoning. The
level-k model predicts greater coordination under public information than under pri-
vate information.
3.2 Robustness
Threshold strategies, comparative statics, and the coordinating role of public infor-
mation are robust predictions of limited depth of reasoning models. These results
hold under only weak assumptions on the behavior of L0. And, they hold for any
limited depth of reasoning model.
More specifically, the regularities only rely on assumption A1. A1 is a very weak
requirement and holds trivially under the specification that L0 behavior does not
depend on information. The level-k model also places specific assumptions on the
beliefs of each cognitive type about the cognitive types of others. Specifically, an Lk
type believes there are only Lk-1 types. Cognitive hierarchy, another popular limited
depth of reasoning model, assumes that a Lk type believes there are all lower types
with weights determined by a conditional Poisson distribution. In general, we could
think that an Lk type may hold any distribution of beliefs over the lower types. The
exact belief structure does not matter. Moreover, the exact type distribution does
not matter. The results hold for any distribution of types in the population. In other
words, they hold for any limited depth of reasoning model. This is shown in Appendix
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B.
The results even hold for L∞ types. L∞ types have infinite depths of reasoning
but believe others have bounded depths of reasoning. Further, the results hold for
some proportion of sophisticated types. These are types that have infinite depths of
reasoning and take into account the fact that others may also have infinite depths of
reasoning. We show in Appendix B that as long as the proportion of sophisticated
types is not too large, limited depth of reasoning with sophisticated types is consistent
with the existing experimental evidence.
One of the main criticisms of the limited depth of reasoning literature is that
predictions are not robust to model specification. This is not true for the aggregate
predictions of the coordinated attack game. They are robust predictions of limited
depth of reasoning models.
4 Empirical Analysis
This section analyzes the experimental data from Heinemann et al. (2004) (HNO
hereafter).14 The distribution of level-k and equilibrium types are estimated using a
finite mixture model. Allowing for level-k types significantly improves our ability to
explain the experimental data.
For this section, the results rely on the specification of a particular limited depth
of reasoning model. We use the level-k model. This is because the quantitative
predictions of the model (the threshold cutoffs used by different types) are needed
in order to fit the model to data. This does not mean that other limited depth
of reasoning models would not fit the data equally well or even better than the
level-k model. But the goal of this exercise is to show that there exists a limited
depth of reasoning model that explains the data better than equilibrium. Notice that
this exercise is different to that in Section 3, which concerns itself with qualitative
predictions. In that case we showed limited depth of reasoning models make robust
qualitative predictions that are consistent with existing experimental evidence.
14In this section, we restrict attention to the experimental data from Heinemann et al. (2004),
because it includes both a private and public information treatment.
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4.1 The experiment
Subjects play a finite player game similar to the above game. In each session, there
are 15 subjects who simultaneously decide whether to attack or not attack. An attack
is associated with an opportunity cost t (which is modeled as the safe payoff to not
attacking). An attacking subject earns the amount θ if the attack is successful. An
attack is successful if and only if a sufficient number of players attack. The threshold
to a successful attack is determined by a(θ) which is a non-increasing function of θ.
Low θ represents good fundamentals and a high threshold to a successful attack. High
θ represents poor fundamentals and a low threshold to a successful attack.
This game differs from the game analyzed in previous sections in a number of
ways: it is a discrete player game, the payoff from a successful attack depends upon
the fundamentals, and a lower θ corresponds to better fundamentals. However, none
of these changes alter the previous analysis in a substantial way.15 The only change
to note is that the attack/non-attack regions are flipped. Players attack if and only
if their signals are above the cutoff threshold.
There are two information treatments in the experiment. A private information
treatment (PI) and a common information treatment (CI). In PI, players do not
know the fundamental, but know that θ is distributed uniformly on [10, 90] and re-
ceive private signals xi randomly drawn with independent and uniform conditional
distributions on [θ − 10, θ + 10]. In CI, players learn the fundamental θ when they
receive a precise public signal y = θ. There are also four different payoff parametriza-
tions. The payoff to the safe (not attack) option varies between t = 20 and t = 50
and the threshold parameter ψ, a(θ) = 15(80−θ)
ψ
, varies between ψ = 60 and ψ = 100.
The eight treatments are summarized in Table 1.
We analyze the data from a total of 29 sessions and 435 subjects. Subjects play
16 rounds in the experiment, but we analyze only the first round because we are
interested in initial play. In each round, each subject receives 10 signals and makes a
choice for each signal (attack or not-attack), for a total of 4350 choices.
15See Appendix C for an analysis of the level-k results. See HNO for an analysis of the equilibrium
results.
15
Table 1: Treatments
Treatment Information Safe Payoff (t) ψ Sessions
PI 20 100 Private 20 100 1
CI 20 100 Public 20 100 1
PI 50 100 Private 50 100 1
CI 50 100 Public 50 100 1
PI 20 60 Private 20 60 6
CI 20 60 Public 20 60 5
PI 50 60 Private 50 60 7
CI 50 60 Public 50 60 7
4.2 Econometric Analysis
The analysis uses two main econometric methods. First, we follow Heinemann et al.
(2004) and Duffy and Ochs (2012) and estimate aggregate mean thresholds by es-
timating a logit response model in which the binary attack decision depends on a
constant and the signal (Z = x or y). That is, we use maximum likelihood estima-
tion to find the coefficient estimates aˆ and bˆ, that are a best fit to the logit response
function:
Pr(attack|Z) = [1 + exp (−a− bZ)]−1
The attack threshold can be viewed as the critical value, Z∗, for which a represen-
tative player is indifferent between attacking and not attacking, which obtains when
Pr(attack|Z∗) = 0.5. Using this, we can obtain the estimated mean attack threshold
Zˆ∗ = − aˆ
bˆ
. The standard deviation is given by pi
bˆ
√
3
. We take the standard deviation to
be a measure of the coordination of subjects around the estimated attack threshold.
Second, we follow Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) and estimate a finite mixture model
that allows for different behavioral types. This approach assumes that each subject’s
type is drawn from a fixed common prior distribution over all types. The types we
allow include: an equilibrium type (E) who believes all other types are equilibrium
types, an L1 type who believes all other types are L0 types whose behavior is fixed
(and specified below), and an L2 type who believes all other types are L1 types.
We assume that each player follows the predictions of a particular type with error.
Because subjects often make a type’s exact choices, we use a simple spike-logit error
structure. Index types k = 1, . . . , 3 and choices by q = 1, . . . , 10. In each choice, a
subject has a given probability 1− of making her type’s exact choice, and with error-
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rate, , makes choices that follow a logistic distribution with error density, dkq(a
i
q, λ).
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The parameter λ represents the logistic precision parameter.
For subject i, let Qik represent the set of choices where subject i’s action is con-
sistent with type k’s predicted action. The aggregate log-likelihood function is given
by
lnL(p, , λ|a) =
S∑
i=1
ln
 3∑
k=1
pk
∏
q∈Qi
(
1− + dk(aiq, λ)
) ∏
q∈QiC
dkq(a
i
q, λ)
 (5)
where S is the number of subjects.
With three types, this model has 4 independent parameters: 2 independent type
probabilities pk, a precision parameter λ, and an error-rate .
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In order to fully specify this model, we must specify the behavior of L0 types.
In most level-k applications, L0 behavior is chosen to be either uniformly random
or some focal behavior. However, we know from previous coordination experiments
that players tend to focus on payoff-dominant outcomes (at least during initial play)
(Costa-Gomes et al. 2009) and Crawford et al. (2008) find that level-k models with
L0 players biased towards payoff-salient outcomes explain behavior in coordination
games fairly well. For these reasons, we assume that the behavior of L0 types is given
by a discrete probability function q(l) over {0, 1, . . . , 14} that first-order stochasti-
cally dominates the uniformly random distribution.18 This biases the behavior of L0
types towards the payoff-dominant outcome (attack) relative to the uniformly random
specification. Notice that this specification of L0 behavior satisfies assumption A1.
16The error density, dkq (a
i
q, λ), is defined d
k
q (a
i
q, λ) =
exp[λSkq (a
i
q)]
exp[λSkq (attack)]+exp[λSkq (not−attack)]
. The term,
Skq (a
i
q), is type k
′s expected payoff from playing action aiq in choice q, given type k’s beliefs about
the actions of others.
17We limit attention to an aggregate analysis because of the way the data is structured. Subjects
make choices for 10 random signal draws. Depending on the random draws, we may not be able
to identify a type for every subject. As well, the design is a between subjects design, subjects do
not make choices under both public and private information. It is only in the private information
treatments that L1 and L2 types are identified separately (although public information treatments
are still helpful for seperating level-k and equilibrium types). Thus, we use the aggregate analysis
as a substitute for the individual analysis. Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) run both individual and
aggregate analyses and find virtually the same results (individual results recorded in earlier version
of the paper (Costa-Gomes et al. 1998 )).
18Specifically, the distribution used is q(0) = q(1) = q(2) = q(3) = q(4) = 1/60, q(5) = q(6) =
q(7) = q(8) = q(9) = q(13) = q(14) = 4/60, and q(10) = q(11) = q(12) = 8/60.
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Each type’s behavior is determined by a threshold cutoff. A type attacks if and
only if her signal is above the threshold cutoff. Given the behavior of the L0 types
we can determine the threshold cutoffs for L1 and L2 types. The threshold cutoffs
for equilibrium types are given by the unique equilibrium thresholds in the private
information treatments and by the global games thresholds in the public information
treatments.19 Thresholds vary across both information treatments and safe-payoff
treatments for all four types. The type’s threshold predictions are given in Table 2.
These thresholds fully specify each type’s predicted actions. A type k attacks if and
only if her signal in choice q is greater than or equal to her cutoff threshold.
Table 2: Threshold Predictions by Type
CI PI
t ψ E L1, L2 E L1 L2
20 100 33.3 27.3 32.4 27.7 29.5
50 100 60 53.3 61 53.4 58
20 60 44 37.5 41.8 38.3 39.6
50 60 64 57.7 66.0 57.9 61.2
4.3 Aggregate Regularities
The mean threshold cutoffs are estimated for each treatment using the binary response
logit model specified in the previous section. Table 3 lists the estimated mean cutoff
thresholds and the associated standard deviations for each treatment.20
19HNO find that the global games equilibrium explains this data better than any other known
equilibrium selection method, i.e. payoff-dominance, risk dominance or max-min.
20The patterns we observe in the first round data are similar to the patterns observed by HNO
across the entire 16 rounds.
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Table 3: Estimated Mean Threshold Cutoffs
  Treatment  
(n=4350) PI_20_100 CI_20_100 PI_50_100 CI_50_100 PI_20_60 CI_20_60 PI_50_60 CI_50_60 
         
Estimated  
mean threshold 30.36 37.24 58.14 53.50 48.54 36.90 60.62 54.63 
Estimated  
standard deviation 29.63 22.79 17.06 15.12 29.14 29.02 22.77 17.79 !!!!!numdev!=!!!!!!!!!0!!!279!!!222!!!190!!!175!!!!!!!0!!!!!0!!!!57!!!!89!!!116!!!!!!!0!!!!!0!!!!!0!!!!32!!!!59!!!!!!!0!!!!!0!!!!!0!!!!!0!!!!27!!!!>>!sum(devpersubject)!!!!ans!=!!!!!!!279!![]!/!
We can see from Tables 2 and 3 that mean thresholds are closer to the level-k
predictions than the equilibrium predictions. As well, mean thresholds are lower in the
PI20 and CI20 treatments relative to the PI50 and CI50 treatments. Subjects respond
to changes in the safe payoff t as predicted in both the level-k and equilibrium models.
Mean thresholds are also lower in the CI treatments relative to the PI treatments in
all cases except when t = 20 and ψ = 100. The level-k model is consistent with these
patterns. However, equilibrium predicts that the mean threshold should increase in
the CI 50 60 treatment relative to PI 50 60, which is not true in the data.
Lastly, notice that the standard deviation of estimated thresholds is lower in the
CI treatments relative to the corresponding PI treatments. This is inconsistent with
an equilibrium analysis, which predicts that coordination should be weakly better
under private information than public information. The level-k model is consistent
with this pattern, as the level-k model predicts that coordination should be strictly
better under public information than under private information.
4.4 Model Estimation
The type classification is based on 435 subjects who each make 10 choices. There are
279 choices that separate the predictions of E and L1 types, 222 choices that separate
the predictions of E and L2 types and 57 choices that separate the predictions of L1
and L2 types.
Table 4 gives the maximum likelihood estimates of equation (5). The first column
gives the estimates for the combined model that includes all three types: E, L1, and
L2. The second column gives the estimates for the level-k model and the third column
gives the estimates for the equilibrium model. In the combined model, level-k types
make up 83 percent of the estimated type distribution. L1 types are most frequent,
making up 70 percent of the type distribution and L2 types make up 13 percent. This
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Table 4: Aggregate Type Classification
MODEL: All Types Level-k Equilibrium
Log-Likelihood -1955.80 -1960.16 -2138.97
L1 .6993 .6695
(.0487) (.0542)
L2 .1312 .3305
(.0556) (.0542)
E .1695 1
(.0700)
λ .0410 .0430 .0255
(.0032) (.0028) (.0020)
 .7366 .7906 .7084
(.0365) (.0367) (.0354)
n 4350 4350 4350
AIC 3953.5 3953.8 4294.7
BIC 3921.6 3928.4 4281.9
*Notes: bracketed numbers are bootstrapped standard errors clustered
at the subject level.
is compared to 17 percent for equilibrium types.
The level-k model fits the data better than the equilibrium model looking at both
AIC and BIC. But, the combined model does not really offer an improvement over
the level-k model. The AIC for the model with all four types is 3953.5, which is only
marginally smaller than the AIC for the level-k model, 3953.8.
Both the precision parameter and the error-rate parameter combine to determine
the rate of deviation from each type’s predicted play. Types follow their type’s pred-
icated action about 83 percent of the time on average.
5 Conclusion
The existing experimental evidence on coordinated attack games presents a challenge
to equilibrium theory, which mispredicts the coordinating roles of public and private
20
information. Limited depth of reasoning models provide a consistent explanation
of experimental behavior across different information conditions. Having a model
that explains experimental behavior under private and public information provides a
behaviorally-motivated answer to the debate over the potentially destabilizing effects
of public information.
In addition, this paper highlights robust predictions of the level-k model. The
main results from coordinated attack experiments are robust predictions of limited
depth of reasoning models. This demonstrates that limited depth of reasoning models
have predictive power even if L0 and the type distribution are not stable across games.
In particular, comparative static predictions hold for a wide class of these models.
Determining accurate comparative statics does not require determining accurate point
predictions. This is especially desirable if what we care about is policy prescriptions
and not necessarily point estimates.
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A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
The expected payoff gain for an L1 type who receives signal x can be written as
piL1(x) = D
ˆ ∞
−∞
φ
(√
α + β(θ − µx− (1− µ)y)
)
[1−Q(θ|x, y)] dθ − t
This expression is continuous and strictly decreasing in x by A1 and A2. To see this
notice that there are two effects to consider. First, 1−Q(θ|x, y) is weakly decreasing
in x for a given θ. Second, the mean of the distribution of θ shifts as x increases
which puts more weight on higher values of θ, which means more weight is put on
smaller values of 1 − Q(θ|x, y). The two effects work in the same direction. Also,
piL1(−∞) > 0 and piL1(∞) < 0 by properties of the normal distribution. As a result,
L1 types play a threshold strategy with cutoff κ1 determined implicitly by equation
(2).
Claim: Lk types play threshold strategies with cutoff κk ∀ k ≥ 1.
This claim is proved by induction on k.
It is true for L1 types by the above argument.
Suppose it is true for Lk-1 types.
Lk types expect a proportion Φ(
√
β(κk−1 − θ)) of players to attack. Since Φ is
continuous and strictly decreasing in θ, we can find a unique θ¯k such that an Lk
type thinks there is a successful attack if and only if θ ≤ θ¯k where θ¯k is determined
implicitly by equation (4).
The expected payoff gain for an Lk type who receives signal x is then given by
piLk(x, θ¯k) = D
(
1− Φ(
√
α + β(µx+ (1− µ)y − θ¯k))
)
− t.
piLk is continuous, strictly decreasing in x, piLk(−∞) > 0 and piLk(∞) < 0. As a
result, Lk types play according to a threshold strategy with cutoff κk determined by
implicitly by equation (3).
The result follows by induction.
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the case for level-k types. Let the distribution of types be specified by
λ1, λ2, . . . where λk is the proportion of Lk types.
Let LK(θ) be the proportion of all Lk types that attack,
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LK(θ) =
∞∑
k=1
λkΦ
(√
β(κk − θ)
)
LK(θ) is continuous and strictly decreasing in θ. Thus, there exists a unique θ¯ such
that LK(θ¯) = θ¯ and there is a currency crisis iff θ ≤ θ¯.
We want to know how θ¯ changes when some parameter z varies. If ∂κk
∂z
> 0(< 0) ∀k,
then LK(θ) is shifted to the right (left) and hence ∂θ¯
∂z
> 0(< 0).
Claim: ∂κk
∂D
> 0, ∂κk
∂t
< 0 and ∂κk
∂y
< 0 ∀k ≥ 1
Show by induction on k.
Consider k = 1. Let
F = D
ˆ 1
0
(
1− Φ
(√
α + β(µκ1 + (1− µ)y − l)
))
q(l|κ1, y)dl − t
The cutoff is implicitly determined by F = 0.
By the proof of Proposition 1 ∂F
∂κ1
< 0.
∂F
∂D
=
´ 1
0
(
1− Φ (√α + β(µκ1 + (1− µ)y − l))) q(l|κ1, y)dl > 0 ,
∂F
∂t
= −1 < 0 ,
∂F
∂y
< 0. This is analogous to ∂F
∂x
.
Therefore, by the implicit function theorem, ∂κ1
∂D
> 0, ∂κ1
∂t
< 0 and ∂κ1
∂y
< 0.
Now suppose the claim is true for k− 1.
Equations (3) and (4) jointly determine κk.
From the equation (4) we have:
dθ¯Lk
dz
=
√
βφ(·)
1 +
√
βφ(·)
dκk−1
dz
Totally differentiate equation (3) taking into account the effect on the cutoff θ¯Lk :(√
α + βµφ(·)
)
dκk −
(
t
D2
+
√
α + βφ(·)dθ¯
Lk
dD
)
dD = 0⇒ ∂κk
∂D
> 0
(√
α + βµφ(·)
)
dκk +
(
1
D
−
√
α + βφ(·)dθ¯
Lk
dt
)
dt = 0⇒ ∂κk
∂t
< 0
(√
α + βµφ(·)
)
dκk +
√
α + βφ(·)
(
(1− µ)− dθ¯
Lk
dy
)
dy = 0⇒ ∂κk
∂y
< 0
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The claim follows by induction.
Thus, by the argument above: ∂θ¯
∂D
> 0, ∂θ¯
∂t
< 0 and ∂θ¯
∂y
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
Define the function f : RxR→ R by
f(x, κ) = D
(
1− Φ(
√
α + β(µx+ (1− µ)y − θ¯(κ)))
)
− t
where θ¯(κ) is implicitly determined by θ¯(κ) = Φ(
√
β(κ− θ¯(κ))).
Define the function b : R→ R by letting b(κ) be the value that solves f(b(κ), κ) = 0.
By argument in proof of Proposition 1, b is a well-defined function. By the implicit
function theorem ∂θ¯
∂κ
> 0 and ∂b
∂κ
> 0. So, b is a strictly increasing, continuous
function. Notice that f(x¯, x¯) = 0 defines the equilibrium cutoff x¯. This means
that b has a unique fixed point. Define the function bk : R → R recursively by
bk(κ) = b(bk−1(κ)) for k ≥ 2.
Now let κ1 be such that κ1 < b(κ1).
Consider the following real sequence {bn(κ1)}∞n=1. This sequence is increasing, since
b is an increasing function and κ1 < b(κ1). The sequence is also bounded since b is a
bounded function (bounded above by x¯)
Since {bn(κ1)} is bounded, continuous, and increasing, it has some limit, call it c.
c = lim
n→∞
bn+1(κ1) = lim
n→∞
b (bn(κ1)) = b
(
lim
n→∞
bn(κ1)
)
= b(c)
where the third equality follows from continuity of b. Since, b has a unique fixed point
c = x¯.
We can find the analogous result for any κ1 such that b(κ1) < κ1.
The proof follows by noticing that κk = b
k−1(κ1).
Proof of Corollary 1
Let z be the signal received (i.e.. either z = x or z = y).
The expected payoff gain of an L1 type is given by
piL1z (z) = D
ˆ ∞
−∞
φ(
√
β(θ − z))[1−Q(θ|z)]dθ − t.
By similar arguments as in Proposition 1, piL1 is strictly decreasing and continuous
in z. Therefore, L1 types play threshold strategies with cutoff κz1 determined by
piL1z (κ
z
1) = 0. Players attack if signal z ≤ κz1 and do not attack otherwise.
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Claim1: Lk types play threshold strategies with cutoff κXk ∀ k ≥ 1 in the private
information game
This claim is proved by induction on k.
It is true for L1 types by the above argument.
Suppose it is true for Lk-1 types.
Lk types expect a proportion Φ(
√
β(κXk−1 − θ)) of players to attack. Since Φ is
continuous and strictly decreasing in θ, we can find a unique θ¯k such that an Lk
type thinks there is a successful attack if and only if θ ≤ θ¯k where θ¯k is determined
implicitly by Φ(
√
β(κXk−1 − θ¯k)) = θ¯k.
The expected payoff gain for an Lk type who receives signal x is then given by
piLk(x, θ¯k) = D
(
1− Φ(
√
β(z − θ¯k))
)
− t.
piLk is continuous, strictly decreasing in x, piLk(−∞) > 0 and piLk(∞) < 0. As a result,
Lk types play according to a threshold strategy with cutoff κXk uniquely determined
by piLk(κXk , θ¯
k) = 0
The result follows by induction.
Claim2: Lk types play threshold strategies with cutoff κY ∀ k ≥ 1 in the public
information game
This claim is proved by induction on k.
It is true for L1 types by the above argument.
Suppose it is true for Lk-1 types.
Lk types expect everyone to attack if y ≤ κY .
If y > κY , payoff to attacking is D ·Pr(θ ≤ 0)− t (< 0 since L1 payoff is negative)
If y ≤ κY then payoff to attacking is D · Pr(θ ≤ 1) − t (> 0 since L1 payoff is
positive)
The result follows by induction.
B
Generalized Level-k
The extension from level-k thinking to a general limited depth of reasoning model
follows almost immediately. L1 types best respond only to L0. As a result, the
behavior of an L1 type is unchanged under any limited depth of reasoning model.
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Suppose L1 types play a threshold strategy with cutoff κ1. Let λ
k
i be the proportion
of Li types that an Lk type believes she is playing against.
Claim: Lk types play threshold strategies with cutoff κk ∀ k ≥ 1.
This claim is proved by induction on k.
It is true for L1 types trivially, analysis doesn’t change.
Suppose it is true for Lk-1 types.
First consider the case where λk0 6= 0. Lk types believe the proportion of players
attacking is given by λk0l0 + λ
k
1Φ(
√
β(κ1− θ)) + . . .+ λkk−1Φ(
√
β(κk−1− θ)). Thus, Lk
types believe they get a payoff D if λk0l0 +λ
k
1Φ(
√
β(κ1− θ)) + . . .+λkk−1Φ(
√
β(κk−1−
θ)) ≥ θ. Using the distribution Q, we can then write the expected payoff of an Lk
type as
piLk(x, κ1, . . . , κk−1) =
ˆ ∞
−∞
φ(
√
α+ β(µx+(1−µ)y−θ))
(
1−Q
[
1
λk0
(
θ −
k−1∑
i=1
λki Φ(
√
β(κi − θ))
)
|x, y
])
dθ
piLk is continuous, strictly decreasing in x by A1 and A2 and piLk(−∞) > 0 and
piLk(∞) < 0. To see that piLk is strictly decreasing notice that 1 − Q is weakly
decreasing in x for a given θ. As x increases, the mean of the normal distribution
shifts, placing more weight on higher values of θ. So more weight is placed on lower
values of 1 − Q. The two effects work in the same directions. As a result, Lk
types play a threshold strategy with a cutoff κk where κk is uniquely determined by
piLkσ (κk, κ1, . . . , κk−1) = 0.
Now consider the other case where λk0 = 0. Lk types believe the proportion of
players attacking is given by λk1Φ(
√
β(κ1−θ))+ . . .+λkk−1Φ(
√
β(κk−1−θ)). Thus, Lk
types believe an attack is successful if λk1Φ(
√
β(κ1−θ))+ . . .+λkk−1Φ(
√
β(κk−1−θ)) ≥
θ. The LHS is continuous and strictly decreasing in θ. Therefore ∃ a unique θ¯Lk such
that there is a successful attack iff θ ≤ θ¯Lk. The expected payoff for an Lk type is
then given by
piLk(x, θ¯Lk) = D
(
1− Φ(
√
α + β(µx+ (1− µ)y − θ¯Lk))
)
− t.
piLk is continuous, strictly decreasing in x, piLk(−∞) > 0 and piLk(∞) < 0. As a result,
Lk types play according to a threshold strategy with cutoff κk uniquely determined
by piLk(κk, θ¯
Lk) = 0.
The result follows by induction.
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Sophisticated Types
Proposition. Let γ be the proportion of sophisticated players and let A1 and A2 hold.
If γ α√
β
≤ √2pi, there is a unique equilibrium in the speculative attack game where
sophisticated types attack if and only if x ≤ κs, where κs is uniquely determined.
Proof:
Consider the optimal strategy for a sophisticated type who believes all other so-
phisticated types are playing according to a threshold strategy with cutoff κs. Let the
distribution of types be specified by λ1, λ2, . . . where λk is the proportion of Lk types.
A type Lk plays according to a threshold strategy with cutoff κk. The proportion of
players attacking is given by
L(θ) = (1− γ)
∞∑
k=1
λkΦ
(√
β(κk − θ)
)
+ γΦ(
√
β(κs − θ))
There is a unique value θ¯s such that L(θ¯s) = θ¯s. There is a currency crisis if
and only if θ ≤ θ¯s. Rearranging the expression, L(θ¯s) = θ¯s, and letting S(θ) =
∞∑
k=1
λkΦ
(√
β(κk − θ)
)
, we can get the following relationship between κs and θ¯
s,
κs = θ¯
s +
1√
β
Φ−1
(
1
γ
θ¯s − 1− γ
γ
S(θ¯s)
)
.
An equilibrium cutoff κs is the solution to the following equation
D
(
1− Φ(
√
α + β(µκs + (1− µ)y − θ¯s)
)
= t.
The aggregate size of attack θ¯s is then determined implicitly by equation
α√
β
(y − θ¯s) + Φ−1
(
1
γ
θ¯s − 1− γ
γ
S(θ¯s)
)
=
√
α + β√
β
Φ−1
(
D − t
D
)
.
The left hand side of this expression is continuous in θ¯s, positive for low θ¯s and
negative for high θ¯s. As a result, there always exists a solution. In other words, there
exists at least one threshold equilibrium. There will be a unique symmetric threshold
equilibrium whenever there is a unique solution θ¯s to this equation.
Let G(θ) = α√
β
(y − θ) + Φ−1
(
1
γ
θ − 1−γ
γ
S(θ)
)
.
Then, dG
dθ
=
1
γ
+ 1−γ
γ
(−S′(θ))
φ(Φ−1( 1
γ
θ−( 1−γ
γ
)L(θ)))
− α√
β
.
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Since φ ≤ 1/√2pi and −S ′(θ) > 0 hold, G is strictly increasing whenever √2pi ≥
α√
β
γ .
Uniqueness follows from an iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies argu-
ment. Let pis(x, κ) be the expected gain for a sophisticated player attacking, given
that she observes signal x and all other sophisticated players are playing threshold
strategies with a cutoff κ.
pis(x, κ) = D
(
1− Φ(
√
α + β(µx+ (1− µ)y − θ¯s(κ)
)
− t
Define the function b : R→ R to be the value b(κ) that solves the equation pis(b(κ), κ) =
0. b is well-defined, continuous and strictly increasing by arguments above. There-
fore, b(k) has a unique fixed point, κs. Define the function bk : R→ R recursively by
bk(κ) = b(bk−1(κ)) for k ≥ 2.
Consider strategies that survive 1 round of deletion of strictly dominated strategies.
First, consider strategies that are dominated by playing attack at some signals. The
best payoff that a player could achieve if not attacking at those signals is if all sophis-
ticated types played not-attack for all signals. That is, as if all sophisticated types
played the threshold strategy with cutoff −∞. The best response to sophisticated
types playing with a cutoff −∞ is to play a threshold strategy with a cutoff b(−∞).
This means that any strategy for which not-attack is played for any x < b(−∞) is a
dominated strategy. Following an analogous argument we can show that any strategy
for which attack is played for any x > b(∞) is a dominated strategy. Thus, the set
of strategies that survive 1 round of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies
look like:
play
{
attack
not-attack
if x<b(−∞)
if x>b(∞)
We can now repeat the argument on this smaller set of strategies and show that
the set of strategies that survive k-rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated
strategies look like:
play
{
attack
not-attack
if x<bk(−∞)
if x>bk(∞)
By the argument in the proof of Proposition 3 for a function b that is strictly increas-
ing, continuous, bounded and has one fixed point: bn(x0) → κs as n → ∞ for any
x0 ∈ R. This means that there is a unique strategy that survives iterated deletion of
strictly dominated strategies - the threshold strategy with cutoff κs.
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CProposition. Suppose the behavior of L0 types is given by the cdf Q(l) on {0, . . . , 14}.
(i) Suppose we are in information treatment PI. Then there exists a unique κk,
for each k ≥ 1, such that the behavior of type Lk is given by
play
{
1 if x ≥ κk
0 o.w
(ii) Suppose we are in information treatment CI. Then there exists a unique κ
such that the behavior of type Lk, for any k ≥ 1, is given by
play
{
1 if y ≥ κ
0 o.w
Proof
(i) By induction on k.
Consider k=1.
The expected payoff gain from playing action 1 for an L1 type who receives a
private signal x, given the behavior of L0 is
piL1(x) =
1
2
ˆ x+10
x−10
ˆ 1
a(θ)−1
15
θq(l)dldθ − t
= =
1
2
ˆ x+10
x−10
θ
[
1−Q
(
a(θ)− 1
15
)]
dθ − t
Notice that piL1 is strictly increasing and continuous x. Also, for θ low enough
1 − Q = 0 and for θ high enough, 1 − Q = 1. Thus, there exists xl, xh such that
piL1(xl) < 0 and pi
L1(xh) > 0. Therefore, L1 types play according to a threshold
strategy with cutoff κ1 determined by pi
L1(κ1) = 0.
Assume true for k-1.
Consider k.
The expected payoff gain of an Lk type given that she receives signal x and that
she expects all other players to play threshold strategies with the cutoff κk−1 is
piLk (x, κk−1) =
1
2
ˆ x+10
x−10
θ
[
1−Bin
(
aˆ(θ)− 2, n− 1, θ + − κk−1
2
)]
dθ − t
The function piLk is strictly increasing and continuous in x and there exists xl, xh
such that piLk(xl) < 0 and pi
Lk(xh) > 0. Therefore, there is a unique cutoff κk where
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pi(κk, κk−1) = 0. Best responses for Lk types are to play threshold strategies with
cutoff κk.
The result follows by induction.
(ii) By induction on k.
Consider k=1.
The expected payoff gain from playing action 1 for an L1 type who receives a
precise public signal y is
piL1(y) =
ˆ 1
a(y)−1
15
yq(l)dl − t
= = y ·
[
1−Q
(
a(y)− 1
15
)]
− t
Notice that piL1 is strictly increasing in y and there exists yl, yh such that pi
L1(yl) <
0 and piL1(yh) > 0. If there exists a x such that pi
L1(x) = 0 then define κ such that
piL1(κ) = 0. If not, (may happen since Q is not continuous), let κ be such that
piL1(κ) < 0 and piL1(κ + ) > 0 for any  > 0. Such a κ is unique as piL1 is strictly
increasing. Thus, L1 types play according to a threshold strategy with cutoff κ.
Assume true for k-1.
Consider k.
Lk types expect everyone to attack if y > κ.
If y < κ, payoff to attacking is y · 0− t < 0
If y ≥ κ then payoff to attacking is y · 1− t > 0
The result follows by induction.
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